fix(security): 2 improvements across 1 files#1454
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tomaioo wants to merge 1 commit intoSolaceLabs:mainfrom
Open
fix(security): 2 improvements across 1 files#1454tomaioo wants to merge 1 commit intoSolaceLabs:mainfrom
tomaioo wants to merge 1 commit intoSolaceLabs:mainfrom
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- Security: OAuth tokens stored in localStorage (XSS-exfiltration risk) - Security: OAuth callback does not validate `state`/anti-forgery parameter Signed-off-by: tomaioo <203048277+tomaioo@users.noreply.github.com>
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Summary
fix(security): 2 improvements across 1 files
Problem
Severity:
High| File:client/webui/frontend/src/auth/authCallback.tsx:L11The auth callback stores
access_token,sam_access_token, andrefresh_tokeninlocalStorage. Any successful XSS in the application (or malicious third-party script execution) can read and exfiltrate these long-lived credentials, enabling account/session takeover.Solution
Avoid storing bearer/refresh tokens in
localStorage. Prefer secure, HttpOnly, SameSite cookies managed by the backend, or short-lived in-memory tokens with a hardened refresh flow. If browser storage is unavoidable, usesessionStorage, minimize token lifetime/scope, and enforce strong CSP + XSS defenses.Changes
client/webui/frontend/src/auth/authCallback.tsx(modified)